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Chandler v. James: A Student's Right of Prayer in Public 
Schools * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As our nation recovers from the shock and horror of the recent shoot-
ings occurring at Columbine High and other public schools 1, some point 
to these events as evidence that public schools suffer from a lack of reli-
gious spirituality that comes from organized prayer.2 While religious ex-
pression in public schools continues to be a heated issue, these tragic 
events provide new emotional ammunition for proponents of school 
prayer. Since Engel v. Vitale, 3 courts have struggled to articulate how 
students can express themselves religiously in the public school arena.4 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,5 
the Supreme Court first used the widely recognizable phrase that "stu-
dents [do not] shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse 
gate."6 But the Supreme Court left unanswered the more difficult ques-
tions of determining exactly what rights students are allowed to bring 
with them into the schoolhouse. Through subsequent years, the Supreme 
Court has set boundaries for lower courts to follow. At one end of the 
spectrum, the Supreme Court has allowed students to pray privately or as 
a group;7 at the other end, the Court has restricted officially sponsored 
* Copyright © 2001 by Howard M. Baik. 
I. See An Epidemic of Violence, (visited March 8, 2001) <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/03-
/08/alarming.incidents/index.html>. These shootings include, but are not limited to, the Feb. 29, 
2000 incident at Buell Elementary School in Mt. Morris Township, Michigan, where a six-year-old 
shot to death another first grader; the Nov. 19, 1999 shooting at Deming Middle School in Deming, 
New Mexico, where a 12-year-old shot and killed another student; the May 26, 2000 incident at 
Lake Worth Middle School in Palm Beach County, Florida where a 13-year-old shot and killed his 
English teacher. These incidents occurred after the infamous shootings in Pearl, Mississippi; Padu-
cah, Kentucky; and Littleton, Colorado. 
2. See Betsy Hart, Tragedy Puts Prayer in School, DESERET NEWS, April 30, 1999, at A IS. 
3. 370U.S.421 (1962). 
4. Compare Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) cert. de-
nied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993) (upholding the practice of choosing a volunteer student to give a gradua-
tion prayer), with Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241,41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding graduation 
prayer unconstitutional because of the state's involvement), and ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l 
Bd. of Educ., 84 F. 3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (contradicting the Jones decision, which does not permit 
graduation prayer where the students vote whether to have prayer). 
5. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
6. /d. at 506. 
7. See id. at 513. 
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school prayer.8 However, the area between these two extremes continues 
to be unclear. In Chandler v. James, 9 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit provided guidance to its lower courts regarding "the re-
ligious speech in public school" 10 question by holding that a school dis-
trict does not violate the Establishment Clause when the district allows 
students to initiate religious speech in schools and at school-related 
events. This speech is in fact protected under the Free Speech and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. 
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Chandler, even with its shortcom-
ings, provides a helpful framework from which to analyze cases involv-
ing religious speech in public schools. While the Supreme Court in Santa 
Fe Independent School District v. Doe 11 has recently decided against re-
ligious speech (prayer) before football games, its holding is fact-specific 
and does not contradict the ruling or analysis presented in the Chandler 
case. 
To begin, this Note provides a brief background of the pertinent ju-
dicial history involving prayer in schools and is followed by an examina-
tion of the different ways several federal circuit courts have decided 
school prayer cases after the Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weis-
man.12 This Note then gives a short introduction to Chandler v. James, 
followed by an explanation of the reasoning behind the Chandler court's 
decision and examination of how the Eleventh Circuit's ruling sits in re-
lation to other circuit court decisions. In addition, the Note explores the 
significance of state-sponsored control in determining a First Amend-
ment violation. It further addresses the question of what constitutes stu-
dent-initiated speech and what type of limitations a school can place 
upon it. Reference is made to the Equal Access Act and the principle of 
limited public forums in providing a useful support of the Chandler 
analysis for school prayer cases. Finally, this Note argues that the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe does not void the Chandler analysis 
and that such analysis should be looked to as a valuable tool for examin-
ing issues of prayer in our public schools. 
8. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
9. 180 F.3d 1254 (lith Cir. 1999). 
I 0. /d. at 1254. 
II. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
12. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Violation of the Establishment Clause Under Lee v. Weisman 
In 1962, the Supreme Court decided in Engle v. Vitale 13 that the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment14 prohibited school-
sponsored prayer. Since Engle, lower courts have struggled to deal with 
variations of religious speech in the classroom.15 In 1992, the Supreme 
Court helped to clarify some questions by ruling in Lee v. Weisman that 
prayer at public school graduation ceremonies violated the Establishment 
Clause. 16 
In Weisman, a principal invited a rabbi to give the invocation and 
benediction at a middle school graduation ceremony with instructions 
that the prayers needed to be nonsectarian. 17 Regardless of the nonsectar-
ian nature of the prayers, the Court ruled that the "government involve-
ment with religious activity in this case is pervasive, to the point of creat-
ing a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public 
school." 18 Moreover, in deciding this case, the Court focused on several 
factors: the control of the school over the graduation ceremony, the 
selection of the speaker, the school's attempt to control the content of the 
prayer by instructing that it be nonsectarian, and the essentially obliga-
tory attendance of the students. 19 In addressing these factors, the Court 
concluded that the degree of school involvement related to the graduation 
prayer gave a clear impression of state support.20 
Less than a year after the Weisman case, the Fifth Circuit, in Jones v. 
Clear Creek Independent School District, allowed a student to voluntar-
ily give a graduation prayer after a majority of the graduating seniors 
13. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The Supreme Court ruled in this early prayer case that "New York 
state's prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer." 
!d. at 430. The Court held that this was a violation of the Establishment Clause even though it was 
argued that the prayer to be offered was nondenominational in form and the program would allow 
students to choose to remain silent or leave the room. See id. The Court emphasized that even if a 
prayer is denominationally neutral and students can choose to participate, the First Amendment pre-
vents any type of government sponsorship of the establishment of religion. See id. 
14. The First Amendment of the Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." The Establishment Clause refers to the phrase, "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
15. See supra note 4. 
16. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577. 
17. See id. at 581. 
18. /d. at 587. 
19. See id. at 586-88. 
20. See id. at 590. 
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voted for it.21 The court, while using a similar line of reasoning as in 
Weisman, emphasized the factual differences between the two cases.22 
Specifically, the court focused on the control of the majority vote of the 
senior class in determining whether to initiate a graduation prayer.23 This 
differs from Weisman because there the school not only selected who 
was to give the prayer, but also attempted to control the content of the 
prayer.24 In Jones, the student vote was an important part of the court's 
determination that the school did not direct prayer at its graduation, and 
thus did not violate the Establishment Clause. 25 Critics of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's ruling believe that the decision grossly misreads the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Weisman.26 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court refused 
to grant review of the Jones case, and the question whether student-
initiated prayer through majority vote is constitutionally permitted re-
mains uncertain in some cases.27 Since Jones, federal courts other than 
the Fifth Circuit have examined cases regarding student-initiated 
prayers.28 However, the decisions have varied and reflect the lack of clar-
ity and uniformity regarding state control and student-initiated speech. 
B. Confusion Among the Circuit Courts 
The Weisman decision, although helpful in further shaping the law 
regarding prayer in public schools, left unanswered the important ques-
tion as to whether the ban on school prayer encompasses student-initiated 
graduation prayers or simply applies to those prayers directed and con-
trolled by school officials.29 The discrepancies among the decisions of 
the various appellate courts reflect this confusion. 
Jones was one of the earlier appellate cases to address prayer after 
the Weisman decision.30 However, in 1995, the Third Circuit heard a 
21. See Jones, 971 F.2d at 963. 
22. See id. at 969-71. 
23. See id. at 969,971-72. 
24. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 586-88. 
25. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 971-72. 
26. See ACLU Legal Bulletin, The Establishment Clause and Public School (visited Feb. 21, 
2001) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/religion/pr3.html>. The ACLU bulletin argues that the Court in 
Weisman emphasized that schools maintain a substantial amount of control during a graduation 
ceremony. See id. Because of this control, when a school reserves time on the program for prayer, it 
essentially is endorsing the prayer regardless of whether a voluntary student offers it. Thus, the state 
violates the Constitution. 
27. See id. The Supreme Court in Santa Fe attempted to clarify this issue, but the cases re-
main fact intensive and therefore distinguishable. See infra discussion Part IV.F. 
28. Compare Jones., 971 F.2d at 963, and Harris, 4 I F. 3d at 447, with Black Horse, 84 F. 3d 
at I47I, and Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 32I, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998). 
29. See Ralph Mawdsley, Student Choice and Graduation Prayer: Division Among the Cir-
cuits, I 29 EDUC. LAW REP. 553 ( 1998). 
30. See Jones, 971 F.2d at 963. 
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similar case, ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, in 
which a school allowed the graduating seniors to vote for prayer at the 
graduation.31 Black Horse factually differed from Jones in that students 
in Black Horse were allowed to vote for prayer, no prayer, or a moment 
of reflection.32 Interestingly, the Black Horse court reached an opposite 
conclusion from the Fifth Circuit in Jones. In Jones, the student vote was 
interpreted as a method of eliminating the school's entanglement with 
prayer,33 while the court in Black Horse determined that even a student 
referendum could not "erase the state's imprint from this graduation 
prayer."34 The court determined that delegating one facet of the gradua-
tion ceremony, the choice for a graduation prayer, would not relieve the 
school of its ultimate control over the event or "insulate the School 
Board from the reach of the First Amendment."35 The court further em-
phasized that students are able to determine the existence of a graduation 
prayer only because the school gives them this opportunity.36 The Third 
Circuit prohibited graduation prayer even when a plurality of stu~ents 
voted for it.37 
In another recent circuit court case involving graduation prayer, 
Doe v. Madison School District No. 321, the Ninth Circuit, like the Fifth 
Circuit in Jones, upheld student choice and graduation prayer.38 How-
ever, this case factually differs from both Jones and Black Horse in that 
the students did not vote on the decision to have a graduation prayer. 39 
Instead, the school selected speakers based on academic standing and left 
it up to the students to decide the topic of their speeches.40 In referring to 
the Weisman case, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the importance that the 
Supreme Court placed on the degree of school involvement with the 
graduation prayers in deciding an Establishment Clause violation.41 The 
Ninth Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning as the Jones interpreta-
tion of Weisman and indicated that the facts in Madison showed that the 
31. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1471. 
32. See id. at 1475. 
33. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 970-71. 
34. Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1479. 
35. /d. (indicating that the Weisman case presented an obvious example of the state's entan-
glement with religion. Though the involvement of the state in this case is less obvious, the court em-
phasizes that even a student vote cannot eliminate the school's endorsement of religion from the 
graduation prayer.) 
36. See id. 
37. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1471. 
38. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 832. 
39. See id. at 834. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. at 835. 
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control over prayer was with the students and not the State.42 Thus, if se-
lection of a student speaker is based solely on the neutral criterion of 
academic standing, the student may engage in prayer or religious discus-
. 43 
SIOn. 
On July 13, 1999, the Eleventh Circuit decided another case involv-
ing school prayer, Chandler v. James.44 Factually, this case can be dis-
tinguished from the above-mentioned circuit court cases in that no stu-
dent vote or school selection of a graduation speaker is directly 
involved.45 Instead, the contention surrounds a broad Alabama statute 
permitting nonsectarian student-initiated prayer at mandatory and non-
mandatory events.46 The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Alabama issued an injunction against the statute ruling that it was uncon-
stitutional.47 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the injunction was 
too broad. In narrowing the scope of the injunction, the court held that 
prayers could be allowed at events such as graduations and school as-
semblies, even if mandatory attendance is required.48 
III. CHANDLER V. JAMES 
A. Facts 
In 1996, a vice-principal Michael Chandler and his son, a student in 
the DeKalb Alabama County school system (DeKalb ), challenged the va-
lidity of an Alabama statute which read: "On public school, other public, 
or other property, nonsectarian, non-proselytizing student-initiated vol-
untary prayer, invocation and/or benedictions, shall be permitted during 
compulsory or non-compulsory . . . school-related graduation or com-
mencement ceremonies, and other school-related student events."49 The 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ruled in favor of 
the C:mndlers and held the statute unconstitutional.50 The court further 
42. See id. 
43. See id. at 836. However, the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case where a 
student was prohibited from delivering a graduation speech in which he referenced God and other 
religious sentiments. See Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000), 
cert. denied Niemeyer v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist, _U.S._, 2001 WL 15969 (March 5, 
2001). The Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit decision, which affirmed the district court's de-
cision of allowing the school district to prohibit the speech. 
44. 180 F.3d 1254 (I I th Cir. 1999). 
45. See id. 
46. See id. at 1255. 
47. See id. at 1256-57. 
48. See id. at 1264-67. 
49. /d. at 1256 (quoting Ala. Code§ 16-l-20.3(b) (I 995)). 
50. See id. 
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ordered a permanent injunction prohibiting DeKalb from officially sanc-
tioning "vocal prayer or other devotional speech in its schools."51 It fur-
ther "prohibit[ed] all [school sanctioned, induced and ordered] prayer or 
other devotional speech in situations which are not purely private, such 
as aloud in the classroom, over the public address system, or as part of 
the program at school-related assemblies and sporting events, or at a 
graduation ceremony."52 
DeKalb conceded that the Supreme Court's decision in Weisman 
prohibited school sponsorship, prescription, and endorsement of religion 
in curricular or extracurricular activities. 53 However, the injunction went 
so far as to require school officials to not only abstain from leading or 
participating in public prayer or other religious speech, "but also t'equires 
[them] to forbid students or other private individuals from doing so while 
in school or at school-related events."54 It is this part of the injunction 
that DeKalb appealed. DeKalb did not challenge the district court's rul-
ing of the unconstitutionality of the Alabama statute 55 and that issue will 
not be examined in this paper. 56 
The only question the Eleventh Circuit reviewed was "whether the 
district court may constitutionally enjoin DeKalb from permitting stu-
dent-initiated religious speech in its schools."57 In addressing this ques-
tion, the appellate court directly tackled one of the issues left unclear af-
ter Weisman. 
B. Reasoning of Appellate Court 
The Chandlers argued that all religious speech in public schools, 
even if student-initiated, should be prohibited under the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment. 58 Their argument consisted of two main 
contentions. First, they contend that no difference exists between state 
prayer and student-initiated prayer in public schools and that both give 
the impression of state endorsement.59 Second, they argue that all public 
religious speech in schools is unconstitutional because of its coercive na-
ture and resulting peer pressure on some of the school's students.60 The 
51. /d. at 1257. 
52. /d. 
53. See id. 
54. /d. 
55. See id. 
56. To better understand the history surrounding this Alabama statute and others like it, see 
Wallace v. Smith, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
57. Chandler, 180 F. 3d at 1258. 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. at 1260. 
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Supreme Court in Weisman focused on exactly these two concerns in its 
ruling against graduation prayer.61 However, the Eleventh Circuit dis-
agreed with the arguments the Chandlers proposed and ruled that the dis-
trict court may not prevent DeKalb from allowing student-initiated reli-
gious speech in its schools.62 
The court emphasized that "[t]he suppression of student-initiated re-
ligious speech is neither necessary to, nor does it achieve, constitutional 
neutrality towards religion. For that reason, the Constitution does not 
permit its suppression."63 Further, the court stated that "[b]ecause genu-
inely student-initiated religious speech is private speech endorsing relig-
ion, it is fully protected by both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech 
Clauses of the Constitution."64 To discriminate against student religious 
speech would be to demonstrate outright hostility towards religion, 
which the Freedom of Expression Clause of the First Amendment 
h"b" 65 pro 1 Its. 
In referring to the famous Supreme Court decision in Tinker,66 the 
court reiterated the principle that students do not leave their constitu-
tional rights "at the schoolhouse gate."67 But as the introduction of this 
note indicates, the problem lies in determining which rights students re-
tain after entering the schoolyard. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, reli-
gious speech by a student outside the public school arena "does not be-
come forbidden 'state action' the moment the students walk through the 
schoolhouse door."68 In Weisman, the school's high degree of control 
over the prayer, speech content, and selection of the graduation speaker 
was a determining factor in the Court's ruling against graduation 
prayer.69 In allowing religious speech in graduation ceremonies, the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits in Jones and Madison, respectively, decided that the 
control of the prayer was with the students and not the state.70 In Jones, 
the students voted for the graduation prayer,71 and in Madison the speak-
ers were selected by neutral factors and were given the freedom to 
choose whatever speech topic they preferred.72 The Eleventh Circuit fol-
61. See Weisman, 505 U.S. 577. 
62. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1258. 
63. /d. at 1261. 
64. !d. 
65. See id. at 1261. 
66. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
67. Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
68. /d. at 1261-62. 
69. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577. 
70. See Jones, 971 F.2d at 963; Madison, 147 F.3d at 832. 
71. See Jones, 971 F.2d at 964-65. 
72. See Madison, 147 F.3d at 834. 
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lowed a similar line of reasoning, finding that the government must re-
main neutral with respect to religion.73 The Chandler court maintained 
that genuinely student-initiated speech does not become state sponsored 
simply because it takes place in public schools.74 
The Chandler court stated that simply permitting religious speech in 
schools does not equate to state control and endorsement of religion pro-
hibited by the Constitution.75 Although the court acknowledged the pos-
sibility that permitting student-initiated religious speech might advance 
religion in some sense, it emphasized the assertion that "[s]tate action 
may incidentally advance religion without offending the ConstitutioP "76 
Therefore, the Chandler court ruled that the district court could not con-
stitutionally restrict students from engaging in genuinely student-initiated 
religious speech and vacated the permanent injunction.77 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. State-Sponsored Control of Graduation Events 
In the wake of the Supreme Court's Weisman decision, the question 
still remained whether the ban on school prayer encompassed student-
initiated graduation prayers or simply applied to graduations under the 
management and direct control of school officials. While circuit courts 
have dealt with this issue,78 the Eleventh Circuit directly addressed this 
question by indicating that student-initiated religious speech in public 
schools, free from the direct control of school officials, is not state prayer 
and therefore is constitutional.79 Critics will argue that no real distinction 
exists between a school controlling a religious activity and merely dele-
gating that control to its students. In fact, the Third Circuit upheld this 
viewpoint in ruling that student-initiated and student-led prayer at 
graduation is unconstitutional because the ceremony remains a school-
sponsored event under the control of school officials.8° Further, the 
Weisman decision clearly indicated that merely delegating the decision 
regarding one or two segments of the graduation ceremony does not di-
minish the state sponsorship. 81 
73. See Chandler. 180 F.3d at 1261. 
74. See id. at 1261-62. 
75. See id. at 1262. 
76. /d. at 1262 (alluding to Widmarv. Vicent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)). 
77. See id. at 1263-66. 
78. See supra note 4. 
79. See Chandler, 180 F.3d. at 1264-65. 
80. See Black Horse, 84 F. 3d at 1471. 
81. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577. 
252 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 15 
It is true that at a graduation ceremony, "teachers and principals must 
and do retain a high degree of control over the precise contents of the 
program, the speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and the de-
corum of the students"82 However, the Eleventh Circuit aptly addressed 
this concern by first acknowledging that the Constitution requires neu-
trality, and later explaining that permitting students to speak religiously 
signifies neither state approval nor disapproval of that speech.83 One 
cannot attribute state establishment or sponsorship of religion simply be-
cause a school gave permission for students to speak on a religious 
topic. 84 The Chandler court took this principle a step further when it 
stated that the religious speech could even advance religion in some 
sense without violating the Constitution.85 The court's reasoning is sound 
because it strikes a balance between state establishment of religion and a 
complete rejection of it in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 
B. Student Impressionability 
A concern that arose in Weisman was student impressionability in 
believing school prayer would be equated with state-sponsored prayer.86 
However, this concern seems misguided. In Westside Community School 
v. Mergens, 87 the Supreme Court accepted the belief that "secondary 
school students are mature enough and are likely to understand that a 
school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits 
on a nondiscriminatory basis."88 
While the court in Weisman worried about the coercive effect reli-
gious speech could have on the students, 89 in a purely pragmatic sense, it 
is difficult to imagine a graduating senior who would see a graduation 
prayer or religious reference in a speech as anything but part of the tradi-
tion and ceremony that has been previously established. High school sen-
iors are mature enough to realize that the school does not sponsor every 
speech it permits. As the dissent in Weisman indicated, our nation's his-
tory and tradition is filled with public ceremonies involving prayers.90 
Americans witness prayers at government ceremonies and presidential 
inaugurations, and congressional sessions open with a chaplain's 
82. /d. at 597. 
83. See Chandler, 180F.3dat 1261. 
84. See id. at 1262. 
85. See id. 
86. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 578, 593-94. 
87. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
88. /d. at 250. 
89. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587-88, 592-93. 
90. See id. at 633 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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prayer--even the legal tender of the United States is printed with the 
words "in God we trust."91 In some public schools, students begin the 
day by reciting the pledge of allegiance, which directly references God. 
Graduation ceremonies have a long history and association with prayer.92 
Prayers at graduation ceremonies are pervasive and are expected to ac-
company the traditional graduation ritual.93 If a graduation prayer is co-
ercive, it is no more coercive than reciting the pledge of allegiance in our 
schools or using currency upon which the words "in God we trust" is 
written. A school can mitigate any impression of sponsored prayer with 
disclaimers printed on programs and read at the beginning of such cere-
monies. Because the remedy for such concern is simple, it is unnecessary 
to prohibit religious references and student-initiated prayer outright. 
C. Limits on Student-Initiated Speech 
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that genuinely student-initiated 
speech is protected by the Free Exercise and the Free Speech Clauses of 
the First Amendment.94 However, questions arise as to what constitutes 
student-initiated speech and what type of limitations, if any, a school can 
place upon it. Some courts explore student-initiated speech as a product 
of a state's lack or limited degree of contro1.95 In fact, the lack of state 
control seems to characterize student-initiated speech.96 However, defin-
ing what is student-initiated speech becomes more difficult when that 
speech occurs in a forum of government or state control. Courts struggle 
with defining the point where state control over the forum would change 
student-initiated speech into a form of state speech, regardless if that 
speech was initiated and voluntarily given by students.97 
Another concern with allowing student-initiated speech is the poten-
tial for abuse. Consider a situation where, in order to avoid state-
sponsored religion, a court prohibits a teacher from leading a school 
choir in religiously oriented Christmas songs at a school holiday assem-
bly. Instead of abiding by the restriction, the teacher/music director al-
lows a voluntary student to take over the leading and directing of those 
particular religious songs.98 Is this speech student-initiated or simply a 
91. /d. at 634. 
92. See id. at 635-36. 
93. See id. 
94. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1261. 
95. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 590-91; Chandler, 180 F. 3d at 1264; Westside Comm. Sch. v. 
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252 (1990). 
96. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 590-91; Chandler, 180 F. 3d at 1264. 
97. See id. 
98. See Bauchman v. West High School, 132 F.3d 542 (lOth Cir. 1997). 
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way in which schools can get around the First Amendment and indirectly 
sponsor religious expression? 
The Eleventh Circuit does not define the bounds of student-initiated 
speech99 but other circuit courts have wrestled with whether a student 
majority vote falls under the umbrella of speech that is student-
initiated.100 The Fifth and Third Circuits dealt with this issue and came to 
different conclusions. 101 However, it seems clear that allowing a majority 
of a group to impose their religious beliefs on individuals who do not 
share those beliefs runs contrary to the purpose of the Establishment 
Clause. 102 The Supreme Court has stated: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal princi-
ples to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and prop-
erty, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and 
other fundamental rights ma(c not be submitted to vote; they depend on 
the outcome of no elections. 03 
Thus, it seems that even a ninety-nine percent majority vote should not 
be allowed if the effect results in imposing beliefs on those who do not 
share the same beliefs. 
The second question that arises is what limits, if any, a school can 
place on student-initiated speech. This is an important question since 
schools play a crucial in loco parentis role and must be able to restrict 
speech that disrupts the school's education and teaching goals. 104 The 
Chandler court attempted to answer this question by referring to the 
Equal Access Act and stating that religious speech must be "without 
oversight, without supervision, subject only to the same reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions as all other student speech in school."105 
This seems to give neither standard, practical guidance nor a bright-line 
rule for schools to follow. However, a more extensive analysis of the 
Equal Access Act and the theory of "limited open forums" 106 provides 
clearer and more concrete guidance. 
99. See Chandler, 180 F. 3d 1254. 
100. The Supreme Court has recently addressed this issue in Santa Fe lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 
530 U.S. at 290. See infra Part IV.F. 
10 I. See supra note 4. 
102. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624. See also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-226 
( 1963) (holding that the State cannot permit the majority to "use the machinery of the state to prac-
tice its beliefs"). 
103. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638. 
104. See Byron Fisher, Class Lecture for Law and Public Education Seminar at the J. Reuben 
Clark Law School, Brigham Young University (November 1999). 
105. Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1264-65. 
106. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1994). 
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D. Applying the Equal Access Act to School Prayer 
Congress passed the Equal Access Act in 1984 to end "perceived 
widespread discrimination" against religious speech in public schools. 107 
The Supreme Court, in Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 108 later 
upheld the constitutionality of the Act and ruled it to be within the 
bounds of the Establishment Clause. 109 The Equal Access Act allows 
equal access to school facilities and prohibits discrimination based on 
speech content. 110 The Act sets forth the principle of a limited public fo-
rum and designates a public secondary school as such "whenever such 
school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurricu-
lum related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstruc-
tional time." 111 In other words, if a school allows one club to meet on 
campus, then it creates a limited open forum and must allow all other 
clubs on campus as well. A school is not allowed to restrict access based 
on the content or viewpoint of the clubs or speakers. 112 However, the 
school may close the forum at any time by prohibiting all clubs from 
meeting on school grounds. 113 In Salt Lake City, Utah, East High School 
chose to do this rather than allow a gay and lesbian club equal access to 
its facilities. 114 
Whether or not a school graduation is a limited open forum will be 
subject to debate. Although a strong analogous argument can be made 
that if a school allows a student to speak on one topic, then a type of lim-
ited open forum is created. Therefore, other topics should be allowed as 
well. Speeches at school graduation events often have similar themes of 
nostalgia, goals and dreams. But if a school allows a speaker to speak on 
a particular topic of his or her choice, then it can be argued that a limited 
open forum is established and the school must allow other topics as well, 
including religion. Although the school sponsors the graduation cere-
mony, and directs or controls the overall event, the school would not 
control the students' choice of speech content or material. 
107. Catherine A. Loveless, Recent Developments, After-School Use of Public Elementary 
and Junior High School Facilities by Student Religious Groups, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. 
L. 297 (1995). 
108. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
109. See id. 
I 10. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1994). 
I I I. See id. § 407l(b). 
I 12. See ACLU Legal Bulletin, The Establishment Clause and Public Schools (visited Feb. 
2 I, 200 I) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/religion/pr3.html>. 
I 13. See id. 
I 14. See Jennifer Toomer-Cook, State Office Backs S.L. School District, DESERET NEWS, 
April 21, 1998, at 83; Chip Parkinson, Judge Will Hear Suit Against State Senators, DESERET 
NEWS, May I 7, I 996, at 84. 
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While the Equal Access Act prohibits schools from sponsoring, par-
ticipating in, directing or controlling the activities of the student 
groups, 115 the schools still maintain general control over the school facili-
ties. For instance, the school establishes the time during which certain 
rooms can be used and still provides the electricity for the meetings, 
desks and other supplies that might be used. A similar analogy can be 
made in regard to student-initiated speeches. A school controls the se-
quence of the speakers, the printing of the programs and other supplies. 
The general control over the graduation belongs to the school, but stu-
dent-initiated speeches and the voluntary choice of religious expression 
remains in the hands and control of the students. This line of reasoning 
reaches a similar conclusion as the Chandler court in allowing student-
initiated speeches at graduation ceremonies. The concern expressed in 
Weisman over conveying the impression of state sponsorship over reli-
gious speeches 116 could be dealt with by a simple disclaimer or an-
nouncement at the beginning of the ceremony or by printing a disclaimer 
in the graduation programs handed to students and the audience. 
Another area in which the Equal Access Act might be helpful is in 
determining limitations on student-initiated speech. A concern that arises 
with the decision in Jones is the extent to which students will be allowed 
to engage in student-initiated speech. Will students be allowed to speak 
freely on all topics as long as they are student-initiated? It was this con-
cern that brought down the Religious Freedom Amendment Act of 
1998.117 Because of the public's concern that federal courts had misinter-
preted the Constitution by issuing rulings that severely restrict religious 
expression, 118 Congressman Ernest Istook (R-Oklahoma) sponsored the 
Religious Freedom Amendment in an attempt to protect religious free-
115. See 20 U.S.C. § 407l(c)(l)-(5) (1994). 
116. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 590-91. 
117. See H.R.J. Res. 78, 105th Cong. (1998). The Religious Freedom Amendment did not pass 
in the House of Representatives. The amendment was sixty-one votes short of reaching the two-
thirds majority to amend the Constitution (224 against and 203 in favor). See id. The purpose of the 
Amendment was to "restore the right of religious persons to acknowledge their beliefs, heritage, and 
an equal opportunity to participate in government programs, activities, or benefits. The Religious 
Freedom Amendment (RFA) would prohibit Federal and state governments from establishing any 
religion or denying equal access to a benefit because of religious affiliation." H.R. REP. No. I 05-
543, at I ( 1998). The Amendment would have allowed, among other things, sectarian prayers in the 
classroom, personal religious opinions given by teachers during class hours, and prayers at high 
school graduation ceremonies. This amendment was in response to the public's concern that the Su-
preme Court and lower courts have misinterpreted the Constitution by issuing rulings that severely 
restrict religious expression when other forms of free speech are not so restricted, and which result in 
discrimination against a religious viewpoint in public affairs. See H.R. REP. No. 105-543, at I 
(1998). 
118. Carrie A. Moore, School Prayers, DESERET NEWS, April 25, 1998, at A 15. 
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dom. 119 However, unlike the Equal Access Act, the Religious Freedom 
Amendment failed to gamer enough votes for ratification. 120 
Doug Bates, the director of School Law and Legislation for the Utah 
State Office of Education and a critic of the amendment, expressed his 
concern that the amendment would allow tolerance of prayers, even 
those referencing praise to Satan. "If you're going to permit [school 
prayer], you have to permit it all .... "l21 
This same concern is raised in Chandler. The Eleventh Circuit al-
lowed religious expression in schools and at school-related and school-
sponsored events as long as the expression was student-initiated, even at 
mandatory events. 122 However, the court did not define the limits of reli-
gious expression nor did it give any indication of what is religious. 123 An 
assumption can be made that the religious expression envisioned was that 
of the mainstream religions and formalities. There could be a rare but 
possible situation in which a student claims Satanism is his or her relig-
ion and praises Satan in prayer. Although this example is extreme and 
might rarely occur, it begs the question of just how far the Chandler 
court is willing to extend its decision. 
Critics may claim that as long as the speech was student-initiated, 
there does not seem to be any limits to stop it. The Chandler court does 
not entirely ignore this issue. The court does provide some guidance in 
deciding this question by indicating that religious speech must be "sub-
ject ... to the reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions as all other 
student speech in school."124 This guideline, however, is subject to broad 
interpretations. A better guideline on restricting student-initiated speech 
can be found by again looking to the Equal Access Act. The Act allows 
for groups to meet on a school's premises only if their meeting does not 
"materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of educa-
tional activities. " 125 This same principle, applied to student-initiated 
speeches, would sufficiently regulate speech that might cause disruption 
in public schools. The example of the Satanic speech would likely fall 
under the regulatory arms of the school and could be excluded accord-
ingly. 
Therefore, the Equal Access Act, which the Supreme Court has al-
ready ruled constitutional and within the bounds of the Establishment 
119. H.R. REP. No. 105-543. 
120. See Moore, supra note 118. 
121. /d. 
122. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1258-64. 
123. See id. at 1254. 
124. /d. at 1264-65. 
125. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(4) (1994). 
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Clause, 126 and the concomitant limited open forum principle proves use-
ful in analyzing whether student-initiated speech should be allowed in 
public schools and in providing helpful guidelines to answer lingering 
uncertainties left in the wake of Weisman. Under the Equal Access Act, 
any meetings that take place on school facilities must be voluntary and 
student-initiated; no sponsorship by the school is allowed; no employees 
or agents of the school are allowed to participate, direct, conduct, con-
trol, or regularly attend the activities of the student groups. 127 These pro-
visions, along with the other restrictions and guidelines of the Equal Ac-
cess Act previously mentioned, provide useful tools in examining issues 
of student-initiated free speech in the context of a graduation ceremony. 
E. Official Involvement 
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that as long as prayer is not controlled 
and encouraged by school officials, it is protected speech and should be 
allowed. 128 In this way, the court avoids addressing another problematic 
issue involving school prayer. 
A problem with past court decisions requiring nonsectarian prayer is 
that the very suggestion of nonsectarian prayer requires someone to re-
view the prayer to make sure it is nonsectarian. This poses obvious prob-
lems of censorship and biases favoring one religion over another as to 
what is and what is not appropriate religious speech. The Supreme Court 
has clearly indicated that this is not allowed. 129 Having an organization 
decide what is and is not acceptable presents additional problems besides 
the constitutional restrictions. Religious expressions that do not fall 
within the recognizable and acceptable framework of the majority might 
be relegated to pariah status and never permitted. For example, a policy-
making body located in the Bible Belt of the Southeastern United States 
might permit a Baptist-style prayer, but decide that any other variations 
of prayer are not acceptable. The Chandler court wisely focuses on stu-
dent-initiated religious speech and therefore bypasses this issue. 130 
Technically, the Eleventh Circuit in Chandler merely restricted the 
broad permanent injunction issued by the district court. However, in 
reaching its decision the court set forth an analysis and holding that 
seems to support the rights of students to initiate religious speech in pub-
lic schools. Although the Supreme Court declared in Tinker that "stu-
dents [do not] shed their Constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse 
126. See Westside, 496 U.S. at 226. 
127. See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (1994). 
128. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1264-65. 
129. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
130. See Chandler, 180 F.3d 1254. 
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gate," 131 there may be some rights students do not possess even before 
they enter the school. 132 
F. Recent Supreme Court Decision: Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe 
The Eleventh Circuit ruled that as long as prayer is not controlled 
and encouraged by school officials, it is protected speech and should be 
allowed. Recently, the Supreme Court decided a case involving prayer 
before public football games. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe, 133 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, preventing student-led invoca-
tions before the start of public school football games. 
The Santa Fe case involved a challenge to the Santa Fe School Dis-
trict's policy of allowing prayers to be delivered over the public address 
system before home football games. 134 The process involved two majori-
tarian elections: the first determined whether an invocation would be 
given, and the second selected the student who would deliver the mes-
sage.135 
While the outcome of this case seems to run contrary to the Eleventh 
Circuit's decision in Chandler, which seems to expand prayer in schools, 
a close analysis of both cases reveals that Santa Fe does not overrule the 
decision of Chandler. After the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe, 
the Court remanded the Chandler case to the Eleventh Circuit for further 
evaluation in light of its recent decision. 136 The Eleventh Circuit's own 
analysis provides the best explanation as to why Santa Fe and Chandler 
are not in conflict: "So long as the prayer is genuinely student-initiated, 
and not the product of any school policy which actively or surreptitiously 
encourages it, the speech is private and it is protected."137 
131. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
132. Many Supreme Court decisions have given less constitutional protection to minors than 
adults in similar situations. See John Thompson, Student Religious Groups and the Right of Access 
to Public School Activity Periods, 74 GEO. L.J. 205, 219 n.88 (1985) (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 349 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that high school officials are able to search 
students without probable cause or a search warrant); Ingraham v. Wright, 43 U.S. 651, 671 (1977) 
(holding that Eighth Amendment does not prohibit Florida law from allowing corporal punishment 
of school children); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (stating that New York law 
against prohibiting the selling of sexually oriented magazines to minors does not violate the limited 
first amendment rights of the minors); id. at 649 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that in some spe-
cific areas, children do not have a full capacity for individual choice which triggers first amendment 
guarantees). 
133. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). The Supreme Court was split 6-3. 
134. See id. at 290. 
135. See id. at 290-91. 
136. See Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F. 3d 1313 (II'" Cir. 2000). 
137. /d.at1316. 
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In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court held that state-sponsored prayer be-
fore football games is not allowed. 138 The Court reached this conclusion 
by determining that the speech being offered in this particular case was 
not private but public speech. 139 Determining whether speech is private 
or public is difficult, especially in the public school arena. Public schools 
must remain neutral but the line between neutrality and state sponsorship 
of religion is often blurred, putting a greater emphasis on the factual 
analysis and circumstances of each case. In Santa Fe, the Court deter-
mined that the process by which a student was selected and allowed to 
give a prayer involved a great degree of school involvement, so much in-
volvement, in fact, that the line was crossed from neutrality to state spon-
sorship of religion. 140 When this line was crossed, the speech was no 
longer private and therefore not protected by the Free Exercise and Free 
Speech Clauses. 141 In determining school control, the Court focused on 
several facts including the school board's adoption of the policy allowing 
for a message or invocation to be delivered before football games to sol-
emnize the event. The Court also focused on the majoritarian election 
process by which a student would be elected to give a message. 142 
While the opinion does place limits on student-led and student-
initiated invocations in public schools, it is important to note that the Su-
preme Court's ruling does not extend to all student-initiated and student-
led speech that would otherwise be private. 143 In Santa Fe, the Supreme 
Court was particularly concerned about the majority vote by which 
speakers and topics were selected. The Supreme Court was concerned 
that by allowing decisions to be left to a student body majority, the mi-
nority voice would be stifled. 144 But the Supreme Court left open the 
possibility of student-led messages in situations similar to that in Doe v. 
Madison School District No. 321, where a school selects a speaker based 
on neutral grounds such as academic standing and allows the student to 
decide the topic of the speech. 145 
The Eleventh Circuit, in reviewing the Chandler decision in light of 
Santa Fe, appropriately concluded that Chandler does not contradict 
Santa Fe but complements the decision by helping to answer questions 
as to what circumstances religious speech in schools should be consid-
138. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 290. 
139. See Siegelnwn. 230 F.3d at 1315. 
140. See id. 
141. See id. 
142. See id. 
143. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301-303. 
144. See id. at 291, 304. 
145. See id. at 290. 
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ered private and thus protected. 146 The Eleventh Circuit ruled in Chan-
dler, and reaffirmed in Siegelman, that as long as prayer is "genuinely 
student-initiated" and not controlled and encouraged by school officials, 
it is private and therefore protected speech, and should be allowed in 
public schools. 147 The Supreme Court, in Santa Fe, ruled against prayer 
precisely because it was not "genuinely student-initiated." 148 It was con-
trolled and encouraged by school officials. Thus, the Court decided that 
the speech was not private and not protected. 149 The Eleventh Circuit ap-
propriately concluded that Santa Fe and Chandler are not contradictory. 
Thus, the Chandler decision and analysis remain valid. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Chandler decision highlights some important questions with 
which courts continue to struggle with after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Weisman. The Eleventh Circuit gives wide latitude for student-
initiated speech in public schools as long as they are truly initiated by 
students and do not bear "the imprint of the state." 150 Questions do arise 
as to how far a court will go in allowing various topics of student speech. 
In fact, the recent Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe does provide 
more specific limitations in this regard, which were then elaborated upon 
in Seigelman. 
Chandler ruled and Seigelman reaffirmed that student-initiated 
speech is private speech and therefore protected. The Supreme Court 
does not contradict this principle with its decision in Santa Fe. As the 
Eleventh Circuit appropriately decided in reviewing its decision in light 
of Santa Fe, "[s]o long as the prayer is genuinely student-initiated, and 
not the product of any school policy which actively or surreptitiously en-
courages it, the speech is private and it is protected." 151 
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